November 2026

Resolved

Security incident

Wed, Nov 4, 2026, 20:30 CET

Incident post mortem

Summary

On 2 November 2026, an attacker gained unauthorized access to GitBook’s systems.

Using a flaw in GitBook’s SSO login flow, they were able to create login sessions acting as GitBook staff. This allowed them to query the authentication information of a misconfigured GitHub App installed as an integration in our organization, gaining access to our internal code repositories and, eventually, a Cloudflare API key.

Using this key, they gained access to production secrets which granted full infrastructure access through a service account.

Within hours, we disabled every affected internal infrastructure service account. That stopped the attack, and it also took the GitBook app offline. We then rotated every secret and API key in our infrastructure, and every customer secret managed by GitBook. GitBook was fully back online at 11:56 UTC on 3 November, after about 16 hours of downtime.

Everything we’ve seen points to an attack aimed at one GitBook customer rather than at GitBook as a whole. We have found no evidence that any other customer’s content was modified. 

While they had access, the attacker could reach customer data stored in GitBook. So we’ve treated all customer data as exposed, not only the targeted customer. 

How we contained the incident and restored service

Taking GitBook offline was a deliberate decision. Once the attacker was in our cloud infrastructure, keeping the platform running meant they could keep looking for access while we worked. We chose a longer outage over that risk.

While offline, we rotated every secret in our production infrastructure and every GitBook-managed customer secret, invalidated all API tokens issued before our final cutoff, recycled all nodes in staging and production, and reversed everything the compromised service account had done. We also disabled our back office while we strengthened its safeguards.

This incident is on us. We’re sorry, both for the disruption and for not communicating with you sooner.

The next section sets out exactly what was accessible, what we found, and what we’ve done about it.

What this means for your data

The attacker had access to our production environment for about 2:45 hours on the evening of 2 November, and about 40 minutes early on 3 November. 

During that time, the following customer data was accessible to them:

  • GitBook API tokens

  • Integration tokens and secrets

  • Session signing secrets 

  • Questions asked to GitBook Assistant by your site visitors

  • Documentation sites using authenticated access

  • GitHub 

    • Further info: the attacker could act as the GitBook app, but only in the repositories each customer had given the app access to. We cannot determine whether they took any action in customer repositories. We have suggested remedial steps below.

  • GitLab

    • Further info: the attacker could act on GitBook’s behalf in connected GitLab projects temporarily, but only in the repositories each customer had granted access to. We cannot determine whether they took any action in customer repositories. We have suggested remedial steps below.

  • Your content, such as docs, spaces and change requests

    • Further info: we have found no evidence that any other customer’s content was modified

Billing information, passwords or IP addresses have not been compromised. 

What you need to do, in case you haven’t acted yet

User and customer communications with instructions on what to do were sent out on November 3. If you haven’t acted yet, these are the actions to complete immediately:

  • All customers using the GitBook API: Create a new API token. We revoked all personal API tokens, but customers’ existing apps need to be updated

  • Customers with connected third-party tools: Rotate any third-party API tokens or secrets you use to connect other tools to GitBook.

  • Customers with integrations: If you have published integrations that use secrets, rotate those secrets.

  • Git Sync (GitHub app): No action needed. We rotated these keys for you.

  • GitLab: No action needed. We rotated these keys for you.

  • Authenticated access with a custom backend: regenerate your authenticated access signing key in the GitBook app and update it in your backend implementation

If you’re unsure what applies to you, contact your account manager or our support team.

Indicators of compromise

We have identified the following IP addresses implicated in this attack:

  • 94.183.188.91

  • 45.139.84.195

  • 198.251.83.217

We recommend you review your environments for any mentions of these IP addresses to ensure that your data hasn’t been compromised.

Impact

Availability

GitBook went offline from 20:32 UTC on 2 Nov to 11:56 UTC on 3 Nov, about 16 hours. Cached published sites stayed up for part of that window.

Scope of the attack

Our investigation indicates the attacker’s activity focused on a single customer, but did have access to the customer data shared above.

Systems accessed

Our internal code repositories, parts of our compute infrastructure, and the deployed code and secrets of our edge network.

Data accessed

Our source code, infrastructure secrets, database credentials, integration tokens and Git Sync secrets.

Data modified

No evidence of any customer content being modified.

Customer action

New API tokens; reconnecting Git Sync and GitLab, if applicable; rotating integration secrets

If anything is found that changes the above picture, we’ll contact affected customers directly.

Timeline (UTC)


11/02/2026 12:27 - First hijacked account at the targeted customer


11/02/2026 16:32 - Attacker gains access to staff sessions, then access to our source code


11/02/2026 17:48 - Attacker reaches our production environment


11/02/2026 18:10 - Internal alert of unauthorized activity; investigation starts


11/02/2026 19:58 - SSO flaw fixed


11/02/2026 20:32 - Compromised accounts disabled; attacker cut off; GitBook app taken offline


11/03/2026 02:34 - Redeployment with new secrets begins; all existing API tokens invalidated


11/03/2026 03:09 - New Cloudflare Workers are deployed


11/03/2026 06:00 - GitBook team begins to prepare a new release with newly cycled credentials


11/03/2026 10:52 - GitHub app keys rotated


11/03/2026 11:56 - All secrets rotated; GitBook fully back online


11/03/2026 22:51 - GitLab tokens used for Git Sync rotated

Next steps

We’ve already closed the paths the attacker used and fixed the exploited vulnerabilities.

We’re making changes to make sure an attack like this can’t happen again. We’re hardening our networking infrastructure, introducing changes to how we manage changes across the stack and investing further in our monitoring and detection capabilities. 

We commit to writing about this incident, our learnings and actions following it, and our broader engineering approach to security practices in the coming weeks and on an ongoing basis. 

We hope that by going into details, we can help other companies avoid the same mistakes that we made.

Why this attack was different & what this means for SaaS security

This wasn’t a broad scan for outdated software. The attacker targeted one of our customers and, once inside, the attacker moved with a speed and precision that pointed to an attack driven largely by automation and AI. 

The sophistication of the attack and how quickly it went from initial incursion to full access would’ve been unthinkable a few years ago.

This is where attacks are heading for every SaaS company. In late 2025, Anthropic reported a campaign in which AI carried out 80–90% of the tactical work. 

For us, three lessons follow:

  1. Every forgotten credential is a liability: Least privilege, short-lived credentials and secret scanning have to be the default.

  2. Response speed has to match attack speed: That means automated detection and a practiced plan to contain fast.

  3. SaaS vendors are a route to their customers: Every SaaS provider is part of its customers’ security perimeter.

We’re applying all three to ourselves first, and we’ll share what we learn.

Our commitment

We’re sorry. We hold ourselves to the highest standards, and we know an incident like this affects the trust you place in GitBook.

We hope the transparency in this post, and the actions we’ve already taken, help rebuild that trust.

If you have questions, contact your account manager or our support team. For live updates, visit status.gitbook.com. 

Sara Tandowsky, GitBook CEO
Samy Pessé, GitBook Co-founder & CTO

Previous updates

Wed, Nov 4, 2026, 11:36 CET

We can confirm that the security incident that occurred on November 2 is now resolved. We’ve restored functionality across the GitBook platform. 

Due to an ongoing GitHub outage unrelated to this incident, Git Sync remains affected.

In the meantime, please review the guidance below and complete any actions that are still outstanding.

We’ll share a full postmortem within the next 24 hours, including a timeline and details of the incident, our response, and the steps we’re taking to prevent similar incidents in the future.

We apologize again for any disruption this incident has caused, and appreciate your patience and understanding.

The GitBook Team

Tue, Nov 3, 2026, 16:21 CET

The GitBook app, the GitBook API, and published docs are available again. A few services may still be degraded as we finish restoring everything to full performance.

What happened

GitBook has been the target of a sophisticated, highly targeted attack using AI agents. 

At 19:00 CET, November 2, the attacker gained unauthorized access to some of our infrastructure credentials. We detected the attack immediately and acted swiftly to block further impact. 

To make sure our infrastructure was fully secure, we then took the GitBook app and authenticated docs sites offline. We kept publicly published content live for as long as possible, using cached data.

What we did immediately

  • Blocked the attacker and closed the vulnerabilities involved

  • Replaced every credential and secret across our infrastructure

  • Brought services back only once we were confident they were secure

  • Invalidated every customer’s API tokens on our platform

Your data

Our investigation shows that the attacker may have accessed the following:

  • Integrations tokens

  • Git Sync secrets

  • API tokens

  • Questions asked to GitBook Assistant by your site visitors

At this stage, we have found no evidence that any of your content in GitBook was modified.

What you need to do now

  • Rotate any existing GitBook API tokens. We revoked all personal API tokens during the incident.

  • Rotate any third-party API tokens or secrets you use to connect other tools to GitBook.

  • If you have published integrations that use secrets, rotate those secrets.

  • If you use the GitBook MCP server, re-authenticate it.

Please contact your GitBook organization’s admin to assist with this process.

What we are doing next

  • Monitoring the situation in case of further attacks.

  • Introducing further security measures to our platform.

  • Writing a full post mortem that will be published soon with more detailed information about the incident.

If you have any further questions, please reach out to your account manager or our support team. You can also check status.gitbook.com for updates

Thank you for your patience, and we apologize again for the disruption

The GitBook Team

Tue, Nov 3, 2026, 13:15 cet

Yesterday, November 2, we detected a security incident affecting GitBook’s infrastructure. We contained it quickly and, as a precaution, we’ve taken some services offline while we secure our systems. We apologize for the disruption this is causing, but your security is our number one priority.

This is a platform wide issue affecting a number of customers. We’re actively working on a fix and will have an update for you in the coming hours.

What happened: We detected and contained unauthorised access to parts of GitBook’s infrastructure.

Service status: Some services are temporarily offline as a precaution and will be restored once systems are confirmed secure.

Customer data: The investigation is ongoing. We will confirm whether any data was affected once the review is complete.

Action required: None at this time. We’ll share instructions on any steps you may need to take once services are restored.

Updates: Live updates are available at status.gitbook.com. We’ll share a full post-incident report once the investigation is complete.

If you have any questions, please reach out to our support team or contact your account manager

Thank you for bearing with us, we apologize again for the inconvenience.

The GitBook Team

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